07-13-2009, 10:48 AM
ISLAMABAD: After relative success against the Taliban elsewhere, the Pakistani military faces its toughest test yet – a surgical operation against the country’s most dangerous warlord in a region of harsh terrain and fierce tribal rivalries.
The target of the air and ground offensive, now in its early phases, is Baitullah Mehsud – the leader of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Baitullah is believed responsible for scores of suicide attacks – possibly including the December 2007 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.
Pakistan considers Baitullah its greatest domestic threat. The US views him as a danger to its war effort in Afghanistan because his base in South Waziristan harbours Taliban fleeing across the border.
For years, Washington has pressed Islamabad to go beyond half-hearted offensives and fragile peace deals to root out the Taliban from FATA.
Now it appears Pakistan may be heeding the call following major ground operations against the Taliban in Bajaur Agency and Swat. But taking on Baitullah and his force of up to 10,000 followers in South Waziristan would likely prove tougher.
Roughly half the size of Connecticut, South Waziristan is a mountainous, underdeveloped territory. It has a leaky border with Afghanistan, barely any government infrastructure and fiercely independent, heavily armed Pashtun tribes hostile to interference by outsiders – including the Punjabi-dominated army.
Already, army officials are stressing that the operation would be limited – focusing on capturing or killing Baitullah and destroying his terror infrastructure rather than targeting other groups.
“Baitullah is the main centre of gravity. He is a leader who has declared himself the emir, the ruler of the other factions, also. He has been the main source of terrorism in Pakistan,” Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, the army’s chief spokesman, told The Associated Press.
As it ramps up its offensive, the military is trying to choke off sections of South Waziristan under Baituulah’s control. Major roads are being cleared and potential escape routes sealed off to isolate the Taliban before the army’s campaign takes off, said Abbas.
“We want to create certain effects in the area, like softening the targets, targeting their training centres, their suicide-bombing centres, and also hit hard their logistics. That will reduce their force capability,” said Abbas.
By limiting the scope of the operation, the Pakistanis hope to avoid alienating other tribes, whose support – or at least neutrality – would be crucial to eliminating Baitullah.
The key to that effort is to cut deals with other militant leaders such as Maulvi Nazir, who recently agreed to a ceasefire. Nazir’s fighters maintain a significant presence along the Afghan border and could help restrict movements of pro-Mehsud Taliban to and from Afghanistan.
“They cannot afford to alienate every single militant,” said Kamran Bokhari of STRATFOR, a private security think-tank in Austin, Texas. “The tribes, the militia leaders, they are adjusting day by day. It’s an issue of sorting out the baddies from the ones who aren’t fighting the Pakistani state.”
In February, Pakistan said it had defeated the Taliban in Bajaur after a six-month offensive, and it is now winding down a nearly three-month battle in the Swat Valley. But violence occasionally flares in Bajur – which, while also a rugged border area, is smaller than South Waziristan. And in Swat, several insurgents are believed to have fled to the hills.
Other differences add to the South Waziristan challenge. Swat does not have as strong a tribal structure, and it was legally a full-fledged part of Pakistan with government presence. Bajaur tribes are not as well off as those in Waziristan and appear more willing to work with the military, even setting up their own militias to take on the Taliban. Aside from the porous border, South Waziristan’s terrain poses other problems.
The Pakistan Army is organised and trained to fight its traditional rival, India, on the eastern plains rather than guerrillas entrenched in mountains. The army, with US assistance, is improving its counterinsurgency capabilities, but is far from being as nimble enough. Several factors have contributed to growing public anger against the Taliban, including their foray into a district just 100 kilometres from Islamabad, and a video showing Taliban militants flogging a young woman.
Whether the support would survive a long and bloody fight in South Waziristan is unclear.
Some analysts suspect the US and Pakistani governments have a secret deal allowing the US missile strikes, even though Pakistan publicly protests them, saying they anger the tribes.
Bokhari said the Pakistani military has weeks, not months, to make an impact in South Waziristan because public support for the operation could fade. Even if it never captures or kills Baitullah, the army needs to be able to say it has destroyed his network.
“Now you have momentum,” said Bokhari. “You don’t want to drag it out too long.” ap
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp...009_pg7_17
The target of the air and ground offensive, now in its early phases, is Baitullah Mehsud – the leader of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Baitullah is believed responsible for scores of suicide attacks – possibly including the December 2007 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto.
Pakistan considers Baitullah its greatest domestic threat. The US views him as a danger to its war effort in Afghanistan because his base in South Waziristan harbours Taliban fleeing across the border.
For years, Washington has pressed Islamabad to go beyond half-hearted offensives and fragile peace deals to root out the Taliban from FATA.
Now it appears Pakistan may be heeding the call following major ground operations against the Taliban in Bajaur Agency and Swat. But taking on Baitullah and his force of up to 10,000 followers in South Waziristan would likely prove tougher.
Roughly half the size of Connecticut, South Waziristan is a mountainous, underdeveloped territory. It has a leaky border with Afghanistan, barely any government infrastructure and fiercely independent, heavily armed Pashtun tribes hostile to interference by outsiders – including the Punjabi-dominated army.
Already, army officials are stressing that the operation would be limited – focusing on capturing or killing Baitullah and destroying his terror infrastructure rather than targeting other groups.
“Baitullah is the main centre of gravity. He is a leader who has declared himself the emir, the ruler of the other factions, also. He has been the main source of terrorism in Pakistan,” Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas, the army’s chief spokesman, told The Associated Press.
As it ramps up its offensive, the military is trying to choke off sections of South Waziristan under Baituulah’s control. Major roads are being cleared and potential escape routes sealed off to isolate the Taliban before the army’s campaign takes off, said Abbas.
“We want to create certain effects in the area, like softening the targets, targeting their training centres, their suicide-bombing centres, and also hit hard their logistics. That will reduce their force capability,” said Abbas.
By limiting the scope of the operation, the Pakistanis hope to avoid alienating other tribes, whose support – or at least neutrality – would be crucial to eliminating Baitullah.
The key to that effort is to cut deals with other militant leaders such as Maulvi Nazir, who recently agreed to a ceasefire. Nazir’s fighters maintain a significant presence along the Afghan border and could help restrict movements of pro-Mehsud Taliban to and from Afghanistan.
“They cannot afford to alienate every single militant,” said Kamran Bokhari of STRATFOR, a private security think-tank in Austin, Texas. “The tribes, the militia leaders, they are adjusting day by day. It’s an issue of sorting out the baddies from the ones who aren’t fighting the Pakistani state.”
In February, Pakistan said it had defeated the Taliban in Bajaur after a six-month offensive, and it is now winding down a nearly three-month battle in the Swat Valley. But violence occasionally flares in Bajur – which, while also a rugged border area, is smaller than South Waziristan. And in Swat, several insurgents are believed to have fled to the hills.
Other differences add to the South Waziristan challenge. Swat does not have as strong a tribal structure, and it was legally a full-fledged part of Pakistan with government presence. Bajaur tribes are not as well off as those in Waziristan and appear more willing to work with the military, even setting up their own militias to take on the Taliban. Aside from the porous border, South Waziristan’s terrain poses other problems.
The Pakistan Army is organised and trained to fight its traditional rival, India, on the eastern plains rather than guerrillas entrenched in mountains. The army, with US assistance, is improving its counterinsurgency capabilities, but is far from being as nimble enough. Several factors have contributed to growing public anger against the Taliban, including their foray into a district just 100 kilometres from Islamabad, and a video showing Taliban militants flogging a young woman.
Whether the support would survive a long and bloody fight in South Waziristan is unclear.
Some analysts suspect the US and Pakistani governments have a secret deal allowing the US missile strikes, even though Pakistan publicly protests them, saying they anger the tribes.
Bokhari said the Pakistani military has weeks, not months, to make an impact in South Waziristan because public support for the operation could fade. Even if it never captures or kills Baitullah, the army needs to be able to say it has destroyed his network.
“Now you have momentum,” said Bokhari. “You don’t want to drag it out too long.” ap
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp...009_pg7_17