01-25-2011, 12:22 PM
Colonel Sultan Ameer Tarar, known as ‘Colonel Imam’, appears to have died a death just as shadowy as his professional life. The former ISI official was highly respected among the Afghan Taliban for his role in the war against the former Soviet Union after 1979; he was also widely believed to have acted as a ‘go between’ linking militants to intelligence elements – but what seems to have been less known is the fact that the late Colonel was looked upon with distrust by other militant elements, including the Taliban factions who apparently abducted him and another former ISI official Squadron Leader Khalid Khwaja in March last year – while they were visiting North Waziristan, apparently with a British journalist. The unfortunate Khwaja was killed soon afterwards. The fate of Imam seems less clear. While a Taliban spokesman has said he died of a heart attack, there are accounts which suggest he may have been murdered after his family failed to pay ransom. Yet another account of what may have happened comes in a report in this newspaper which states he may have landed up in the hands of a group involved in the Kashmir jihad and that the death of both Imam and Khwaja may be linked to an internal squabble between jihadi forces. It is hard to say if the whole truth will ever surface.
Certainly many aspects of the militancy remain rather hazy with facts impossible to distinguish from conjecture. But it is quite apparent, as has also been driven home by the kidnapping and death of Imam, that the militants are not a homogenous body. It is a fallacy to look upon them as such. There are deep lines of divide separating them and severe rivalry in some cases. The Afghan and Pakistan Taliban are one example of this. The differences that exist between them may explain why Colonel Imam ran into trouble in territory he considered safe. They have also played a part in determining differences in perspective between Islamabad and Washington, even though both fight a common enemy. This reality complicates the battle against the militants. We are taking on not just one entity but a monster with many heads pulling in different directions. Even now, there is only limited understanding of the ideological leanings of the various groups, their inter-connections and the question of who they see as friends and who as foes.
Certainly many aspects of the militancy remain rather hazy with facts impossible to distinguish from conjecture. But it is quite apparent, as has also been driven home by the kidnapping and death of Imam, that the militants are not a homogenous body. It is a fallacy to look upon them as such. There are deep lines of divide separating them and severe rivalry in some cases. The Afghan and Pakistan Taliban are one example of this. The differences that exist between them may explain why Colonel Imam ran into trouble in territory he considered safe. They have also played a part in determining differences in perspective between Islamabad and Washington, even though both fight a common enemy. This reality complicates the battle against the militants. We are taking on not just one entity but a monster with many heads pulling in different directions. Even now, there is only limited understanding of the ideological leanings of the various groups, their inter-connections and the question of who they see as friends and who as foes.